The engineering problem
Authentication before an operating system starts cannot rely on ordinary OS services. BootGate works within UEFI protocols for input, persistent variables, randomness, platform measurements, and executable loading.
Policy and persistence
The C application derives password verifiers with PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, keeps separate recovery credentials, compares derived values in constant time, and records failed attempts in nonvolatile firmware variables. Successful policy evaluation allows the application to load and start a selected bootloader.
Platform-dependent security
Optional PCR 7 snapshots expose a TPM-backed platform-state signal. EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL supplies randomness when available; a weaker fallback is a limitation requiring attention. Firmware boot configuration and variable integrity remain part of the trust boundary.
Evidence to inspect
BootGatePkg/BootGate/BootGate.c contains the application; the repository also includes a threat model, installation and Secure Boot notes, and a QEMU test harness. Emulator and physical-platform results are distinct: neither is implied by source review alone.
Current scope
Firmware research prototype, not disk encryption or a complete physical-access defense. Boot-path bypass, variable integrity, optional TPM availability, and a weaker TSC-based entropy fallback matter to its threat model. The QEMU harness is provided; EDK II/QEMU and physical hardware were not rerun in this audit.